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ABSTRACT 
 
This study used panel datasets from 143 Johannesburg Stock Exchange-listed non-financial firms 
and four variants of the partial adjustment model fitted with the random effects Tobit estimator to 
investigate the validity of the market timing, trade-off and pecking order hypotheses of capital 
structure. The study documents that leverage is positively correlated to the modified external 
finance weighted average market-to-book ratio (EFWAMB). Firm profitability and growth rate 
are negatively correlated to leverage whilst firm size and asset tangibility are positively correlated 
to leverage. The firms also have target leverage ratios towards which they actively adjust at an 
unbiased speed of 41.80% for the market-to-debt ratio and 52.82% for the book-to-debt ratio. 
EFWAMB has a negligible effect on the firms’ speeds of adjustment towards target leverage. The 
results are robust. These results reject the market timing hypothesis in support of the dynamic 
trade-off and pecking order hypotheses. They further confirm the fact that these two theories of 
capital structure are not mutually-exclusive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he market timing theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002) which was developed from the initial empirical 
works of Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1992) and of Lucas and McDonald (1990) has emerged as 
a leading alternative to the trade-off and pecking order theories in explaining corporate financing 
behaviour. The theory states that the observed capital structures are a reflection of past attempts by managers to time 
both the equity and the debt markets in raising capital.  According to the market timing theory, the security choice 
issuance and repurchase decisions are affected by the current state of the capital markets, which ultimately reflect 
the current valuation of the equities and debts securities, as well as the current interest rates (Marsh, 1982). Thus, if 
managers follow the market timing hypothesis, they will only issue shares when they believe that the firm’s shares 
are currently overvalued, and will only repurchase shares when they believe that the shares are undervalued (Barclay 
& Smith, 2005).  
 
A study by Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) found that, firms issue equity when the stock market is high, as 
this signals that management believes the shares are overvalued. Conversely, the repurchase of shares is attractive 
when the market is low, as the shares will be undervalued. Dittmar (2000) found that firms repurchase shares to 
exploit potential undervaluation. Welch (2004) contends that stock market performance is the most important 
determinant of corporate financing. The main advantage of issuing equity when the market is high is that the firm 
maximises its net cash issuance proceeds during such times. The chances of issuance successes are also very high 
during such periods. A rising stock market will mechanically reduce the leverage ratio measured in market value 
terms. Thus, when the stock market is high, firms are more inclined to issue equity than debt (Hovakimian, Opler & 
T 
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Titman, 2001). The implication of this financing behaviour is that a rising stock market is associated with low 
leverage.  
 
The decision to issue debt also depends on the state of the bond market and the prevailing interest rates. 
The cost of debt is therefore a major determinant of the debt issuance decision. This implies that firms will time debt 
markets; they will issue debt when interest rates are low. The empirical findings of Barry, Mann, Mihov and 
Rodriguez (2008) and of Henderson, Jagadeesh and Weisbach (2006) confirm the market timing behaviour with 
regard to debt issuance. Firms issue less debt when interest rates are high, because high interest rates reduce the 
value of the loan in real terms, as firms pay a higher price for a small loan amount. The market timing theory does 
not, however, explain what happens when the stock market is low and the bond market is high. Would the firm be 
indifferent about issuing equity or debt, or would it do dual issuances under these circumstances? 
 
In summary, the market timing theory rejects the idea of an optimal or target capital structure capital 
structure as hypothesised by the dynamic trade-off theory. It also rejects the financing hierarchy hypothesis of the 
pecking order theory.  According to the market timing theory, the sole determinant of the corporate financing 
decision is the over/undervaluation of securities.  This implies that firms do not rebalance their capital structures, 
and hence the target speed of adjustment (SOA) is zero. Furthermore, it implies that the interest tax shields, non-debt 
tax shields, agency costs and the financing hierarchy play no role in the corporate financing decision. 
 
The main objective of this study was to test for the validity of these assertions in the context of firms from 
an emerging economy. The question that was asked is: Do firms from emerging economies in Africa time the market 
in their security issuance decisions? 
 
As is the practice with other leading capital structure theories, Baker and Wurgler (2002) used data from 
COMPUSTAT firms in developing the market timing theory. Subsequent tests of the theory have also been limited 
to US and European firms, with studies by Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) and De Bie and De Haan (2007) 
rejecting the hypotheses of the market timing theory in explaining the financing behaviours of UK, Dutch and 
continental European firms. Another study by Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008) using data drawn from firms in all the 
G-7 countries, documents evidence that is inconsistent with the market timing hypothesis and more in line with the 
dynamic trade-off theory. The validity of the market timing theory in explaining the financing behaviours of non-
financial firms listed of the JSE still remains untested. Oztekin and Flannery (2012) and De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen 
(2008) documented that the capital structure of firms is largely influenced by the country’s institutional factors, such 
as ease of access to capital markets, level of information asymmetry, financial constraints and aggregate adjustment 
costs. These factors vary across countries and economic regions. Studies by Booth, Aivazian Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2001), Gwatidzo and Ojah and Singh (1999) found that the South African and other emerging 
countries’ institutional factors, such as, level of development of the capital markets, size and sophistication of the 
corporate bond markets, country credit ratings, level of development of tax and legal systems, and protection of 
property rights, differ significantly from those of developed countries such as the USA and the countries in 
continental Europe. A study by Fan, Wei and Xu (2011) also found persistent structural and behavioural 
heterogeneity between firms in emerging markets and those in developed economies. These institutional, structural 
and behavioural differences therefore justify a separate study of South African firms, as findings from studies using 
data from developed countries may be inapplicable to firms in South Africa and other emerging countries.   
 
Furthermore, the leading tests on the validity of the market timing theory use biased panel data estimators 
such the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (Baker & Wurgler, 2002; De Bie & De Haan, 2007; and Mahajan 
& Tartaroglu, 2008) and the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) estimator (Bruinshoofd & De Haan, 2012). 
According to Elsas and Florysiak (2013), these estimators are biased, as they do not take into account the fractional 
nature of the dependable variables. Debt ratios are bounded between 0 and 1. All the above tests also shunned the 
use of the partial adjustment model which, if used, would allow the testing of the effect of including the market 
timing measure in the vector of firm-specific variables used to estimate the firm’s target SOA. Inclusion of this 
measure is expected to reduce the SOA to zero.  
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The main questions that arise are: Can the market timing theory explain the financing behaviour of non-
financial firms listed on the JSE? What is the unbiased SOA for JSE-listed non-financial firms? Does the market 
timing measure have any impact on the firm’s SOA?  
 
The current study used panel datasets obtained from a sample of 143 JSE-listed non-financial firms and the 
partial adjustment regression model fitted with the random effects Tobit estimator to test for the validity of the 
market timing hypothesis in explaining the observed capital structures. The period covered was from 2003 to 2012.  
 
The main findings of the study are as follows: The modified market timing measure is positively correlated 
to both the market-to-debt ratio (MDR) and the book-to-debt ratio (BDR). Firm profitability and growth rate are 
negatively correlated to both the MDR and the BDR.  The variables firm size and asset tangibility are negatively 
correlated to both the MDR and the BDR. The firms investigated exhibit a significant positive SOA. The unbiased 
SOA for the full sample is 41.80% (half-life of 1.28 years) for the MDR and 52.82% (half-life of 0.92 years) for the 
BDR. The market timing measure has a negligible effect on the firms’ SOA towards target leverage. These results 
reject the market timing hypothesis in support of the dynamic trade-off and pecking order theories. The results 
strongly support the dynamic trade-off theory and are robust.     
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the related literature and 
provides a basis for hypothesis development. Section 3 contains the data sources and methodology used. Section 4 
discusses the results of the study, and Section 5 concludes the study.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The implication of the market timing theory are that persistently overvalued firms are characterised by low 
leverages whilst persistently undervalued firms are characterised by high leverages.  The direct measure of equity 
valuation is the firm’s market-to-book ratio or actual share returns. Equity overvaluation occurs when market values 
are higher than book values (Mahajan & Tartaroglu, 2008). Thus, according to the market timing theory, leverage is 
inversely related to the firm’s historical market-to-book ratio. The propensity to issue equity therefore increases with 
an increase in the firm’s market-to-book ratio. 
 
Korajczyk et al. (1992) concede that share mispricing results from a reduction in information asymmetry 
between agents and investors. This reduction in information asymmetry occurs when agents release information 
about the future prospects of the firm based on the general positive outlook of the economy. The firm’s prospects are 
likely to be better during boom periods, and firms are therefore likely to issue equity during boom periods. The 
release of this information increases the firm’s market-to-book ratio thereby lowering the firm’s external financing 
costs. According to Baker and Wurgler (2002), the share mispricing anomaly (overvaluation) can also be caused by 
irrational investors who misprice the firm’s shares by ignoring the fundamentals of firm valuation. In both cases, 
managers exploit share over-pricing by issuing equity, and this sends a signal to investors that the firm’s shares are 
overpriced. Conversely, managers can also exploit the under-pricing of the firm’s shares by either issuing debt 
instead of equity or buying back the firm’s shares. 
 
Investors respond by scaling down the share prices (in cases of overpriced shares) or scaling up the share 
prices (in cases of under-priced shares). According to Smith (1986), the share price of industrial firms can fall by as 
much as 3.14% on the announcement of a share issuance while a straight bond issuance announcement decreases the 
share price by only 0.26%. The rationale for market timing equity issuances is that managers want to maximise their 
net proceeds from security issuances and they can only achieve this if the shares are either correctly priced or 
overpriced. Managers have no incentive for issuing under-priced shares. Again, share prices rise after a repurchase, 
as investors correct this undervaluation (Chan, Ikenberry & Lee, 2007; and Dittmar, 2000). 
 
If firms follow the market timing theory, it means that low leverage firms raise capital when their 
valuations are high and hence they issue equity. Some of the equity proceeds may be used to retire debt. According 
to Lucas and McDonald (1990), equity issuances are preceded by, on average, an abnormal positive share return and 
an abnormal rise in the market. In contrast, high leverage firms raise capital when their valuations are low and hence 
issue debt capital. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) found that debt issuances are signals that the firm’s shares are 
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undervalued. The debt may also be used to finance share repurchases, as the firm can buy back the shares at a 
discount (the shares are undervalued). According to Baker and Wurgler (2002), the effects of market timing are 
persistent, lasting more than 10 years. 
 
The high share returns, are however, not the only reason for the increased propensity towards equity 
issuance. According to Alti and Sulaeman (2012), the likelihood of issuing equity peaks when high share returns 
coincide with a strong demand from institutional investors. In cases where the institutional investor demand remains 
low, firms may still issue debt, even if share returns are high. Furthermore, Dittmar and Thakor (2007) propose the 
managerial investment autonomy theory, which states that managers are likely to issue or retire a security if they are 
likely to agree with shareholders; this implies an agreement parameter for security issuance. These findings, together 
with the market timing theory, imply that the security issuance decision is driven by security over/under-valuation 
and institutional investor demand, as well as the investment autonomy theory. 
 
As with other leading capital structure theories, the evidence concerning the market timing theory is mixed. 
A survey done by Graham and Harvey (2001) indicated that up to 30% of the Chief Financial Officers see equity 
undervaluation as an important factor in making debt-equity issuance decisions. A number of studies including those 
of Burch, Christie and Nanda (2004), Bougatef and Chichti (2010), Denis (2012) and Elliott, Koeter-Kant and Warr 
(2008) have documented that equity overvaluation drives equity issuance decisions. The propensity to issue shares 
coincides with high market-to-book values or high share returns. Equity issuances are preceded by high market-to-
book values, high share returns and increases in share prices. According to Jenter (2005), the perception of share 
mispricing is firmly behind the phenomenon of market timing in IPOs, SEOs, share repurchases and merger and 
acquisitions financing. 
 
The findings of the study by Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian (2004) confirm that equity buybacks 
follow a pattern opposite to that observed in market timing. Firms only purchase shares when they believe that they 
are undervalued, as this enables the firms to get a discount on the purchase price (Ikenberry, Lakonishok & 
Vermaelen, 2000).  
 
The empirical findings of studies by Baxamusa (2011), De Bie and De Haan (2007), Frank and Goyal 
(2004), Hovakimian (2006), and Walker and Yost (2008), however, reject the market timing theory in favour of the 
dynamic trade-off theory. These studies, together with that of Kayhan and Titman (2007), found that the effects of 
market timing are non-persistent. According to Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008), firms fully rebalance their capital 
structures within five years after equity issuances, thus fully eliminating the effects of market timing on the capital 
structure. Alti (2006) found that the market timing effects do not last more than 12 months and that the effects are 
fully eliminated by the second year. 
 
According to Hovakimian et al (2001), equity issuances and repurchase decisions are designed to move the 
firm towards its optimal target capital structure; the decision has nothing to do with timing the market. The security 
issuance and repurchase decisions are meant to eliminate optimal capital structure target deviation spreads that result 
from cumulative profits and losses. Equity issuances are also likely to simply signal management’s confidence about 
future earnings rather than the timing of the market (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
 
In summary, the available evidence on market timing is currently inconclusive.  
 
The Market Timing Measures 
 
The pioneering study of Baker and Wurgler (2002) identifies the external finance-weighted average 
market-to-book ratio (!"#$%&'() ) as a measure of the firm’s market timing behaviour. The measure is defined as 
follows:  
 !"#$%&'() = +,-.,+/-./012/32'45675 ×%&69999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 (1) 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2015 Volume 31, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 2051 The Clute Institute 
Where : and ; denote net equity and total debt issuances respectively; %& is the market-to-book ratio, suffixes < 
and = represent time. Baker and Wurgler (2002) define equity issuances as a change (increase) in the book value of 
share capital, and they define debt issuances as a change (increase) in the book value of debt. The ratio +,-.,+/-./012/32 is 
the ratio of the current period’s external finance to the total external finance over the study period, which in this 
study is the period from 2003 to 2012.  The implication of this measure is that firms that time the market tend to 
have a high  !"#$%&'() since they issue more equity and  less long-term debt when the market-to-book ratio 
(%&) is high.Thus !"#$%&'()is negatively correlated to leverage. This measure includes both short-term and 
long-term debt issuances. Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) argue that the inclusion of short-term debt is 
inappropriate, as issuance of short-term debt is not necessarily a consequence of timing the market-it is only long-
term debt, rather than total debt, that accurately represents the timing of security issuance decisions. They modify 
the Baker and Wurgler (2002) measure to only include long-term debt and specify the resulting measure as:  
 !"#$%&'() = +,->'./+/->'./012/32'45675 ×%&6999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 (2) 
 
Where ?@; denotes long-term debt issuances.  
 
To allow for a comparison between the levels of the !"#$%&', Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) further 
scale the!"#$%&'()market timing measure by the average level of the market-to-book ratio over each firm’s 
entire sample period, %&. The modified market timing measure, !"#$%&'(A, becomes:  
 !"#$%&'(A = 5B( +,->'.,+/->'./012/32'45675 ×%&6999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 (3) 
 
The scaling implies that !"#$%&'(A ≥ 1 if the firm times the market and !"#$%&'(A < 1 if the market 
conditions play no role in security-type issuance decisions. Furthermore, in contrast to the original !"#$%&'()measure, this modified measure of market timing allows for direct interpretation of the regression 
results. The current study uses this modified measure of market timing behaviour. If South African non-financial 
firms time the market in their security issuance decisions, then the leverage will be significantly negatively 
correlated to !"#$%&'(A. A positive correlation or an insignificant negative correlation, in contrast, would validate 
the static trade-off theory.  
 
Market Timing and the Leading Capital Structure Theories 
 
Myers (1984:576) contends that the trade-off and pecking order theories are the two leading capital 
structure theories that explain the financing behaviours of firms. These theories are however, not mutually-exclusive 
(Barclay & Smith, 2005; Moyo, Wolmarans & Brümmer (2013) and Mukherjee & Mahakud, 2012). The trade-off 
theory which Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) developed from the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1963) and 
other traditional theorists states that firms have an optimal financing mix where firm value is maximised. This 
optimal mix occurs at a point where the marginal benefits of tax shields are equal to the marginal agency and 
financial distress costs (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; and Myers, 2001).   
 
According to Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2002), the static trade off theory can be replaced by the more 
relevant dynamic trade-off theory, which contends that, even if firms have target leverage ratios, these are rarely 
static. As the cost of deviating from the target is very small (less than 0.5% of firm value), the observed leverage 
ratios fluctuate around the target within an acceptable range (Ju, Parrino, Poteshman & Weisbach, 2005). The 
deviations from the optimal target debt ratio are corrected through the manipulation of financing means (Byoun, 
2008; and Kayhan & Titman, 2007). The rate of covering the target deviation spread defines the firm’s SOA towards 
the target leverage ratio. The adjustment cannot be immediate, as firms face firm-specific adjustment costs in the 
form of information asymmetries, transaction costs and the opportunity costs of deviating from the target leverage 
(Elsas & Florysiak, 2011). This implies a positive SOA towards the target optimal capital structure. The SOA is a 
function of firm-specific factors, target deviation spread and macro-economic factors (Drobetz & Wanzernried, 
2006; and Hovakimian & Li, 2011). Table 1 below, adapted from (Moyo et al, 2013) shows the SOA results from 
selected empirical studies.  
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Table 1. Results of Selected Empirical Tests on Target Adjustment Speeds 
Study and method used Country of study Speed of adjustment Dependent Variable 
Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2008) 
2-step system GMM procedure 
UK, USA, France, 
Germany & Japan 32.00% market value of equity 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) USA 36.00% market value of equity 
Elsas and Florysiak (2011) 
DPF & the Blundell and Bond(1998) USA 
26.30%  & 
25.60%  
Kayhan and Titman (2007) 
Tobit, OLS  and bootstrapping USA 8.00% market value of equity 
Hovakimian and Li (2011) 
OLS and fixed effects methods USA 5.5-7.40% book value of equity 
Huang and Ritter (2009) 
Long differencing technique USA 21.00% book value of equity 
Mukherjee and Mahakud (2012) 
system GMM procedure India 43.00% book value of equity 
Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012) 
system GMM procedure South Africa 65.00% Total long-term debt 
Moyo, Wolmarans and Brümmer (2013) 
DPF /  the Blundell and Bond(1998) South Africa 
42.44% / 64.89% 
57.64%/74.44% 
Market value of equity 
Book value of equity 
Legend: QMLE= quasi–maximum likelihood estimation; OLS= Ordinary least squares; GMM = generalised method of moment and 
DPF = the dynamic panel data with a fractional dependent variables estimator (it is equivalent to the random effects Tobit estimator) 
 
According to the dynamic trade-off theory, the security issuance decision is driven by the need to reduce or 
eliminate the target deviation spread, thus maximising firm value (Hovakimian et al, 2001). Firms generally have a 
positive SOA. It is also possible to have a negative SOA in the case where the firm over-adjusts its capital structure 
(Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006).   
 
In contrast to the dynamic trade-off theory, the pecking order theory of Myers (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984) is based on the existence of information asymmetry between managers and investors. The theory 
rejects the idea of an optimal capital structure as proposed by the dynamic trade-off theory. According to the 
pecking order theory, security-type issuance decisions are driven by issuance costs and the size of the firm’s internal 
funds deficiency. The internal funds deficiency is a function of the firm’s capital expenditure, changes in working 
capital, dividends paid, current portion of long-term debt and cash flow from operations (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 
1999). To minimise external financing costs, firms finance their internal funds deficiencies in a pecking order. They 
issue securities in a pecking order with low risk debt being the first choice, followed by hybrid instruments and, 
lastly, equity (Tong & Green, 2005). 
 
Thus according to both the dynamic trade-off and pecking order theories, the pricing of securities 
(over/undervaluation) plays no role in the security-type issuance decision. The findings of Bruinshoofd and De Haan 
(2012) confirm that UK and European firms violate the market timing theory, as they raise debt when the stock 
market is high. This financing behaviour is in line with the pecking order theory. A number of studies, including 
those of Elsas and Florysiak (2011), Hovakimian and Li (2011), Huang and Ritter (2009), Leary and Roberts (2005), 
Moyo et al (2013), Mukherjee and Mahakud, (2012), and Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012), found that firms actively 
rebalance their capital structures towards the optimal capital structure. This implies that the security issuance 
decisions are mainly driven by the need eliminate the target capital structure deviation spread. These findings 
invalidate both the market timing and pecking order theories.  
 
The findings of Dong, Loncarski, Ter Horst and Veld (2012), however, confirm that the market timing and 
pecking order theories are not mutually exclusive. They indicated that the least financially constrained firms are 
likely to time their equity issuances and share repurchases. The financing decisions are jointly determined by the 
need for financial flexibility and the need to exploit the mispricing of shares. 
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Firm-Specific Determinants of Leverage 
  
To control for firm-specific effects, the final regression model used in the current study includes the main 
firm-specific determinants of leverage; and to test whether the dynamic trade-off, pecking order and market timing 
theories are mutually exclusive, leverage was regressed on market timing measures (!"#$%&'() or !"#$%&'(A) 
and a set of firm-specific key determinants of leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) 
identify these variables as profitability, firm size, the un-weighted market-to-book ratio and asset tangibility. A 
number of studies, including those of Baker and Wurgler (2002), Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012), De Bie and De 
Haan (2007), Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008) and Xu (2009) use these firm-specific variables, together with an 
appropriate market timing measure, to test for the validity of the market timing theory. The current study also used 
these variables, together with an appropriate market timing measure, to test for the validity of the market timing 
theory in the context of South African non-financial firms.   
 
The Effect of Firm Profitability, Firm Size, the Un-Weighted Market-To-Book Ratio and Asset Tangibility on 
Leverage  
 
Barclay and Smith (2005) contend that profitable firms tend to be large and mature, and have a high stocks 
of tangibles. These firms, however, have limited growth options and hence have lower capital expenditures. 
Profitable firms have a higher propensity towards generating excess free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). According to 
Talberg, Winge, Frydenberg and Westgaard (2008), a firm’s size is positively correlated with its stock of tangibles. 
Asset tangibility is a direct measure of the collateral amount that a firm can offer to its bondholders (Leland, 1994). 
Firms with higher stocks of tangibles offer lenders increased security, which in turn increases the firms’ debt 
capacities and credit ratings which, lower their costs of debt (Giambona, Mello & Riddiough, 2012). These features 
of large and profitable firms combine to give them higher credit ratings and lower bankruptcy costs, and this makes 
borrowing a more attractive option to them. On the other hand, low growth options reduce a firm’s non-debt tax 
shields, which, according to De Angelo and Masulis (1980), are perfect substitutes for the interest tax shields. This 
strengthens the firm’s case for increasing its debt. These characterises of large, mature and profitable firms have 
different implications for both the trade-off and pecking order theories.  
 
According to the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984), the main determinant of a firm’s 
leverage is its internal funds deficiency. This deficiency is financed by raising external capital in a pecking order 
that is, debt is raised first, then hybrid securities, and lastly equity (Myers, 1984).  Large, mature and profitable firms 
with reduced growth rates have more internal funds available, and this lowers their internal financing deficits, which 
in turn reduce their requirements for external finance (Barclay & Smith, 2005). The pecking order theory therefore 
predicts that large, mature and profitable firms will have lower debt ratios, as they face reduced internal fund 
deficiencies or have no internal funds deficiencies.  The theory therefore predicts a negative correlation between 
leverage and the variables firm profitability and asset tangibility. According to the pecking order theory, leverage is 
positively correlated to firm growth rate. 
 
On the other hand, the trade-off theory contends that, large and profitable firms face increased tax bills 
deriving from reduced non-debt tax shields. As large and profitable firms are likely to produce excess free cash 
flows, the agency costs theory states that these firms face higher agency costs which derive from the excess free 
cash flows. (Drobetz & Wanzenried, 2006 and Frank & Goyal, 2009). The trade-off theory contends that the 
problem of an increased tax bill can be resolved by increasing the firm’s debt, which in turn increases the interest tax 
shield and thus lower the corporate tax payable. A firm can increase its debt by substituting the excess internal 
equity with debt. The excess equity is returned to shareholders in the form of increased dividends and share 
buybacks (Barclay & Smith, 2005). The increased debt interest charge reduces the firm’s corporate tax bill while 
maximising its value through the increased debt interest tax shield. Furthermore, increased debt reduces the firm’s 
agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen 1986). The trade-off theory therefore predicts a positive correlation between 
leverage and the variables asset tangibility, firm size and profitability. It predicts a negative correlation between 
leverage and firm growth rate. 
 
The dependent variables uses in this study are defined as follows. The (MDR) is the total interest-bearing 
debt scaled up by the sum of the total debt and the firm market capitalisation and the (BDR) is the total interest-
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bearing debt scaled up by the total assets. The firm-specific explanatory variables are defined as follows. Firm 
profitability (Profitability) is the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) and is 
expressed as a fraction of total assets (TA).  Firm size (Size) is the natural logarithm of the total assets. Asset 
tangibility (Tangibility) is the fixed assets scaled up by the total assets. The un-weighted market-to-book ratio 
(MTB) is the sum of the market value of equity, book value of preference shares and the book value of total debt, 
less the deferred taxes; this is scaled up by the total assets. 
 
The inclusion of the un-weighted market-to-book variable in the regression model also provides a control 
for the cross-sectional variation in the level of market-to-book and this leaves only the residual  influence of the past 
within-firm variation in the market-to-book ratio for the !"#$%&'(). 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses developed above can be summarised as follows:  
 
H1: Market Timing Behaviour:  Firms time the market in their debt-equity issuance decisions and do not 
consecutively rebalance their capital structures. Thus there is a significant negative correlation between leverage and 
the !"#$%&'(). A significant negative correlation between leverage and !"#$%& confirms the validity of the 
market timing theory, whilst a positive correlation or insignificant negative correlation validates the static trade-off 
theory.   
 
H2: Firm-specific Determinants of Leverage: The hypotheses for the correlations between leverage and firm-
specific factors are summarised in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2. Predicted Correlation between Leverage and Firm-Specific Variables 
Firm-Specific Variable Theory Prediction Trade-off Pecking Order 
Profitability + – 
Size + – 
Tangibility + – 
Growth rate (MTB) – +/– 
+ : positive correlation between leverage and the variable 
– : negative correlation between leverage and the variable. 
 
H3: SOA towards Target Leverage: The market timing theory hypothesises that firms do not have target leverage 
ratios and hence will have zero SOA.    
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data Sources  
 
The data sample consisted of 143 JSE-listed non-financial firms with complete data for eight or more 
consecutive years during the period 2003 to 2012. The unbalanced panel was constructed from data drawn from 
standardised annual financial statements that were obtained from the McGregorBFA database. The total number of 
observations for the period was 1,430. In order to allow for a comparison of the results of this study with those of 
the US, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, UK and the rest of continental Europe, this study adopted the 
methodology used by Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) and Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008). It did however extend 
the methodologies of these studies to include the test for the impact of the Baker and Wurgler (2002) market timing 
measure on the SOA towards the target leverage.  
 
Regression Model  
 
Following Baker and Wurgler (2002), Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) and Mahajan and Tartaroglu 
(2008), the basic regression model was specified as:  
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F:GH,'-5 = J5!"#$%&'() + JL M(NOAPOP ' + JQFR(T$)' + JV WPOP ' + XY%T&' + ZH + [H,'-599999999999999999999(4) 
 
Where:F:GH,'-5 is the firm’s debt ratio measured by either the BDR or the MDR at  \, @ + 1; \ denotes a particular 
firm; @ is the current year; @ + 1 is the next year;J5, JL, JQ, JV9]R;9JY are coefficient vectors;ZH denotes the firm fixed 
effect and [H,'-5 is an error term.In this study,!"#$%&'() was substituted by !"#$%&'(A and the resulting model 
was specified as:  
 F:GH,'-5 = J5^' + JL!"#$%&'(A + ZH + [H,'-59999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 (5) 
 
Where ^H,' is a vector of the firm-specific variables contained in model 1.  
 
According to the dynamic trade-off theory, firms have target debt ratios towards which they actively adjust 
at a given speed. The active adjustment towards a target debt ratio assumes a perfect capital market, which implies 
that firms will frequently and fully adjust to their chosen target ratios. However, in practice, firms face information 
asymmetries, transaction costs and adjustment costs, and this implies that they will infrequently and partially adjust 
their capital structures towards their predetermined leverage ratios. A firm’s target leverage, F:GH,'-5∗ ,  is given by:  
 F:GH,'-5∗ = ^H,'J99999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 (6) 
 
Where J is a coefficient vector.  
 
The firm’s leverage partial adjustment model is specified as:  
 F:GH,'-5 − F:GH,' = F:GH,'-5∗ − F:GH,' + [H,'-599999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 (7) 
 
Substituting (6) into (7) and simplifying the equation yields a partial adjustment model that can be used to 
estimate the firm’s SOA towards the target leverage that is:  
 F:GH,'-5 = 1 − a F:GH,' + a ^H,'J + ZH + [H,'-599999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 (8) 
 
Where a denotes the SOA towards the target leverage and ZH is the time-invariant unobserved variable (firm-fixed 
effect). 
 
For the dynamic trade-off theory hypothesis to hold, some of the elements of the coefficient vector must be 
different from zero that is J ≠ 0. In cases where a = 0,it means that the SOA is zero implying that firms have no 
target leverage ratios. If a = 1, it means that the firm immediately adjusts towards its target debt ratio. It is also 
possible to get negative values of a. The negative SOA means that the firm over-adjusts its leverage.    
 
The partial adjustment model can be extended to include the market timing measure. The extended partial 
adjustment model is therefore:  
 F:GH,'-5 = 1 − a F:GH,' + a ^H,'J5 + aJL!"#$%&'(A + ZH + [H,'-5999999999999999999999999999999 (9) 
 
This is the basic regression model and is labelled regression model 1. The alternative partial adjustment 
model only uses the firm-specific variables with no market timing measures. This is expressed as:  
 F:GH,'-5 = 1 − a F:GH,' + a ^H,'J + ZH + [H,'-59999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 (10) 
 
This is regression model 2. 
 
The study used regression model 1 to test for the validity of the market timing and dynamic trade-off 
theories and to estimate the SOA towards the target leverage. Regression model 2 was used to test what impact 
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excluding the market timing measure has on the firm’s SOA towards the target leverage. The random effects Tobit 
maximum likelihood estimator was used to fit both regression models. This estimator is an equivalent of the double-
censored dynamic panel data with a fractional dependent variable (DPF) estimator proposed by Elsas and Florysiak 
(2011) and Elsas and Florysiak (2013). Unlike the much recommended Blundell and Bond (1998) system 
generalised method of moments (GMM), the bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) and the long 
difference estimators, the random effects Tobit/DPF maximum likelihood estimator is unbiased, is consistent in the 
context of unbalanced dynamic panel data with a fractional dependent variable, and also accounts for firm-fixed 
effects. Leverage ratios are fractional in nature; they occur between 0 and 1. This makes the random effects Tobit 
maximum likelihood estimator the most suitable estimator for use in this study. The estimator was implemented in 
Stata using the xttobit command with censors specified as 0 (minimum) and 1 (maximum).   
 
RESULTS 
 
Summary Statistics  
 
The summary statistics of the sample are presented in Table 3. The sample’s median BDR of 0.1171 is 
much lower than those of the firms in the US (0.546), UK (0.538) and continental Europe (0.639) (Bruinshoofd & 
De Haan (2012), De Bie & De Haan, 2007 and Mahajan & Tartaroglu, 2008). The median MDR is 0.0940. These 
statistics confirm the conservative use of debt by South African non-financial firms. This implies that the South 
African firms rely more on equity for their financing requirements. With a median profitability of 19.44% (mean 
20.00%), the South African firms are more profitable than their US (median 13.23%), UK (median 12.69%), Italian 
(median 9.39%), German (median 11.86%) and French (median 11.49%) counterparts. This further implies that the 
South African firms are likely to rely more on internal equity than on external finance, and hence have lower median 
leverage ratios.   
 
The median growth rate which is measured by the market-to-book ratio, is much lower for the South 
African firms tested (median 1.0888) than for the firms from the US (median 1.49), the UK (median 1.33), Italy 
(median 1.16), Germany (median 1.14) and France (median 1.19). The median value of the market timing measure, 
the !"#$%&'(A, is 0.010 for the South African firms, and this is much lower than those  of the firms in the US 
(1.031), the UK (1.015) and continental Europe (1.003) (Bruinshoofd & De Haan, 2012). In accordance with the 
market timing theory, the lower market-to-book ratio and the lower market timing measures suggest that South 
African non-financial firms are less likely to time the market in their security issuance decisions. These firms hold 
higher stocks of tangibles (median 29.21%) than the US (median 24.929%), Italian (median 21.74%), German 
(median 23.10%) and French (median 17.51%) firms. The tangibility of the South African firms tested is however 
lower than that of the UK firms (median 31.84%) (Mahajan &Tartaroglu, 2008). It should be noted that the size 
factors cannot be compared with the statistics from other countries, as the currencies are different. 
 
The Table 3 Summary Statistics 2003-2012 data sample consisted of 143 JSE-listed non-financial firms 
with complete data for eight or more consecutive years during the period 2003 to 2012. The unbalanced panel was 
constructed from data drawn from standardised annual financial statements which were obtained from the 
McGregorBFA database. The total number of observations for the period was 1, 430. To eliminate outlier 
observations and the most extremely misrecorded data, all variables were winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Following Baker and Wurgler (2002:12), !"#$%&'(), !!#$%&', d#$%&', and !"#$%&'(Avalues greater 
than 10 were dropped and negative !"#$%&'(), !!#$%&', d#$%&', and !"#$%&'(Avalues were reset to 
zero. 
 
Market-to-debt ratio (MDR): the total interest-bearing debt scaled up by the sum of the total debt and the firm 
market capitalisation.  
 
Book-to-debt ratio (BDR): the total interest-bearing debt scaled up by the total assets.  
 
Firm profitability (Profitability):  the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) as a 
fraction of the total assets (TA).  
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2015 Volume 31, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 2057 The Clute Institute 
Firm size (Size): the natural logarithm of the total assets.  
 
Asset tangibility (Tangibility): the fixed assets scaled up by the total assets.  
 
Un-weighted market-to-book ratio (MTB): the sum of the market value of equity, the book value of preference 
shares and the book value of the total debt, less the deferred taxes; this was scaled up by the total assets. 
 
Weighted market-to-book ratio: the market timing measures which are defined as follows:  
  !"#$%&'() ≡ +,->'.,+/->'./012/32'45675 ×%&6;   !!#$%&' ≡ 5B( +, +/012/32'45675 ×%&6; 
 d#$%&' ≡ 5B( >'.,>'./012/32'45675 ×%&6 and !"#$%&'(A ≡ 5B( +,->'.,+/->'./012/32'45675 ×%&6 
 
Where : and ?@; denote the net equity and the long-term debt issuances respectively; %& is the un-weighted 
market-to-book ratio; suffix < represents the issuances from a specific year; and = represents issuances for the total 
period. Equity and debt issuances are respectively defined as a change (increase) in the book value of the share 
capital and change (increase) in the book value of the debt.  
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 2003-2012 
Variable No. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
MDR 1,277 0.1716 0.0940 0.2037 0.0000 0.9138 1.5880 5.4508 
BDR 1,287 0.1909 0.1171 0.2801 0.0000 1.0000 5.8844 71.6323 
Profitability 1,430 0.2000 0.1944 0.1186 0.0193 0.4023 0.1693 2.0518 
Size 1,430 14.3066 14.4855 2.0317 10.8046 17.2895 -0.2129 1.9738 
Tangibility 1,430 0.3240 0.2921 0.2278 0.0435 0.7104 0.3895 1.8283 
MTB 1,419 1.3374 1.0888 0.8422 0.3947 3.0554 0.8413 2.5400 fghijklkh 1,427 0.1647 0.0129 0.2606 0.0000 0.7729 1.4847 3.6824 ffhijkl 1,385 0.0721 0.0000 0.1273 0.0000 0.3767 1.6250 4.0351 mhijkl 1,416 0.1215 0.0019 0.1950 0.0000 0.5781 1.5067 3.7514 fghijklkm 1,428 0.1445 0.0104 0.2308 0.0000 0.6936 1.5386 3.8764 
 
Empirical Results  
 
Regression Model Results 
  
The empirical results for regression model 1 are contained in Table 4.  
 
Market Timing Behaviour 
  
The results indicate that the modified market timing measure,!"#$%&'(A, is positively related to both the 
MDR and the BDR. The correlation is significant for the MDR. The market timing hypothesis is thus rejected in the 
case of South African non-financial firms listed on the JSE. The firms do not time the market in issuing securities. 
The market timing theory is therefore not a good descriptor of corporate financing in South Africa.  
 
Firm-Specific Variables 
 
Profitability: The results indicate that in both the MDR and the BDR regressions, profitability is inversely 
related to leverage and is a significant predictor of leverage. Its significance to explain leverage increases with the 
study’s time period and sample size. The results imply that, for non-financial firms listed on the JSE, leverage 
decreases with an increase in firm profitability. Profitable firms have a higher propensity towards retaining more 
profits to finance their future operations and thus depend less on external finance. According to the pecking order 
theory, increased profitability reduces a firm’s internal funds deficiency and hence reduces its need to raise external 
finance. As firms are more likely to firstly raise debt to cover their internal funds deficiencies, increased profitability 
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and earnings retention effectively reduce the firm’s leverage. The study’s finding relating to profitability is thus 
consistent with the pecking order theory.  
 
Size, tangibility and firm growth rate 
 
 The study found that size and tangibility are positively related to both the MDR and the BDR, and the correlation 
significance increases with an increase in the time period and an increase in the sample size of the study. Tangibility 
is a significant predictor of the MDR but a weak predictor of the BDR. Furthermore, firm growth rate is negatively 
correlated to both the MDR and the BDR. The results imply that large firms with higher stocks of tangibles and 
reduced growth rates have higher debt ratios. Conversely, smaller firms with lower stocks of tangibles and increased 
growth rate have lower debt ratios. These findings validate the trade-off theory. According to Barclay and Smith 
(2005), large firms tend to be mature and profitable, and have high stocks of tangibles. These characteristics enhance 
the firms’ debt capacities and credit ratings, thus making borrowing a more attractive option. These firms, however, 
have less growth options and hence lower capital expenditures; which effectively reduces their non-debt tax shields 
(NDTSs). Moyo et al (2013) and Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012) documented similar findings on JSE-listed firms.  
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 Table 4 Regression model 1 results:  
  !"#$,&'( = 1 − , !"#$,& + , .$,&/( + ,/0123456&78 + 9$ + :$,&'( 
 
Where λ is the SOA towards the target leverage, .$,& is a vector of firm characteristics that determine the target leverage and the SOA towards the target leverage, /( and /0 are 
coefficient vectors,  9$ is the time-invariant unobserved variable (firm fixed effect) and :$,&'( is an error term. The vector .$,& consists of the variables: profitability, size, tangibility 
and the un-weighted market-to-book ratio, and these are defined in Table 3. 123456&78is the Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) market timing measure, which is also defined in 
Table 3. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The markings ***, ** and * on coefficient estimates denote significant differences from zero at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. The implied half-life is calculated as: ℎ<=> − =?>" = logC(0.5) logC(1 − ,).  Model specifications are shown under fit statistics. 
 
Table 4. The Effects of Historical Weighted Market-to-Book Ratios in the MDR and the BDR Capital Structure Regressions 
 Variables Speed of Adjustment Fit Statistics 
 Profitability Size Tangibility MTB IJKLMNONP Lev_t-1  Coefficient SOA (λ ) Half-life  (years) Obs Wald Chi2 Prob> Chi2 
Market Leverage (MDR) 
2003-2007 -0.2158*** (-3.38) 
0.0038 
(1.09) 
0.0505 
(1.54) 
-0.0037 
(-0.39) 
0.0580** 
(2.67) 
0.6289*** 
(9.52) 37.11% 1.49 695 207.34 0.0000 
2004-2008 -0.1662* (-2.55) 
0.0104* 
(2.57) 
0.0681 
(1.89) 
-0.0070 
(-0.69) 
0.0507* 
(2.47) 
0 .5973*** 
(9.89) 40.27% 1.35 695 216.96 0.0000 
2005-2009 -0.1695** (-2.68) 
0.0087 
(1.90) 
0.0649 
(1.67) 
-0.0129 
(-1.29) 
0.0478** 
(2.59) 
0.5054*** 
(7.00) 49.46% 1.02 698 131.63 0.0000 
2006-2010 -0.1633** (-2.59) 
0.0095 
(1.92) 
0.0989* 
(2.49) 
-0.0114 
(-1.24) 
0.0564** 
(3.01) 
0.4425*** 
(7.08) 55.75% 0.85 701 132.59 0.0000 
2007-2011 -0.1345* (-2.40) 
0.0017 
(0.59) 
0.0576* 
(2.26) 
-0.0048 
(-0.65) 
0.0989*** 
(3.86) 
0.8055*** 
(14.54) 19.45% 3.20 704 402.21 0.0000 
2008-2012 -0.1437* (-2.54) 
0.0022 
(0.71) 
0.0614* 
(2.47) 
-0.0049 
(-0.60) 
0.0881** 
(2.77) 
0.8008*** 
(25.87) 19.92% 3.12 564 1,026.59 0.0000 
Full Sample -0.2191*** (-4.47) 
0.0073* 
(2.16) 
0.0782** 
(2.76) 
-0.0078 
(-1.05) 
0.0626*** 
(3.48) 
0 .5820*** 
(16.18) 41.80% 1.28 1,259 499.07 0.0000 
Book Leverage ( BDR ) 
2003-2007 -0.2283*** (-3.33) 
0.0152** 
(3.09) 
0.0923* 
(2.19) 
-0.0019 
(-0.19) 
0.0220 
(1.06) 
0.4065*** 
(9.73) 53.35% 0.77 706 183.39 0.0000 
2004-2008 -0.1283* (-2.07) 
0.0145*** 
(3.82) 
0.0906** 
(2.69) 
-0.0006 
(-0.06) 
0.0014 
(0.07) 
0.5906*** 
(12.90) 40.94% 1.32 705 311.61 0.0000 
2005-2009 -0.1235* (-2.08) 
0.0145** 
(2.92) 
0.1240** 
(3.03) 
0.0035 
(0.39) 
0.0116 
(0.71) 
0.4352*** 
(9.45) 56.48% 0.83 707 192.67 0.0000 
2006-2010 -0.1635** (-2.71) 
0.0061 
(1.57) 
0.0689* 
(2.11) 
0.0111 
(1.37) 
0.0086 
(0.44) 
0.6111*** 
(9.08) 38.89% 1.41 708 143.38 0.0000 
2007-2011 -0.1167 (-1.93) 
0.0093* 
(2.47) 
0.0571 
(1.86) 
0.1380 
(1.68) 
0.0059 
(0.24) 
0.6496*** 
(8.96) 35.04% 1.61 709 139.79 0.0000 
2008-2012 -0.1454** (-2.74) 
0.0048 
(1.67) 
0.0457 
(1.95) 
0.0132 
(1.82) 
-0.0048 
(-0.16) 
0.8582*** 
(32.10) 14.18% 4.53 568 1,215.63 0.0000 
Full Sample -0.1971*** (-3.97) 
0.0152*** 
(3.85) 
0.0830* 
(2.47) 
0.0042 
(0.58) 
0.0142 
(0.84) 
0.4718*** 
(17.98) 52.82% 0.92 1,274 500.69 0.0000 
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Target Speed of Adjustment 
 
In all the tests, the firms exhibit a positive and significant SOA. These results confirm that the sampled 
firms have target leverage debt ratios which they continuously adjust towards. The SOA increases with time and 
sample size indicating that the full SOA is the least biased. The true SOA for the sample is 41.80% (half-life of 1.28 
years) for the MDR and 52.82% (half-life of 0.92 years) for the BDR. This means that, in the case of the MDR, 
41.80% of the target deviation spread is covered in one year and it takes 1.28 year to cover 50% of the target 
deviation spread. The target SOA results validate the dynamic trade-off theory and reject the market timing and 
pecking order theories. Using the same random effects Tobit estimator, Moyo et al (2013) documented a target SOA 
of 42.44% (MDR) and 57.64% (BDR) for JSE-listed manufacturing, mining and retail firms. The results of the 
current study are therefore consistent with these findings.  
 
Regression Model 2 Results 
  
The results are contained in Table 5.  
 
Normal Capital Structure Regressions Results 
 
The pattern of the results is similar to that of regression model 1 discussed above; there are no significant 
differences. Profitability and growth rate were found to be inversely proportional to the MDR and the BDR, whilst size 
and tangibility are positively correlated to the MDR and the BDR. Profitability, size and tangibility are significant 
determinants of leverage. The pecking order theory is validated by the negative correlation between leverage and 
profitability. The correlation results for size, tangibility and growth rate all validate the trade-off theory. The results 
concerning the SOA towards the target leverage also follows the same pattern exhibited in regression model 1. The true 
SOA for the sample is 41.92% (half-life of 1.28 years) for the MDR and 52.66% (half-life of 0.93 years) for the BDR. 
The results imply that the impact of the market timing measure is negligible in determining correlations and the SOA. 
The effects of market timing are thus negligible in the context of South African non-financial firms. These results 
confirm the rejection of the market timing theory in the case of non-financial firms listed on the JSE. 
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 Table 5 Regression model 2 results:  
 !"#$,&'( = 1 − , !"#$,& + , .$,&/ + 0$ + 1$,&'( 
 
Where λ is the SOA towards the target leverage,  .$,& is a vector of firm characteristics that determine the target leverage and the SOA towards the target leverage, / is a 
coefficient vector,  0$ is the time-invariant unobserved variable (firm fixed effect) and 1$,&'( is an error term. The vector  .$,& consists of the variables: profitability, size, tangibility 
and the un-weighted market-to-book ratio, and these are defined in Table 3. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The markings ***, ** and * on coefficient estimates denote 
significant differences from zero at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The implied half-life is calculated as: ℎ345 − 465" = log:(0.5) log:(1 − ,).  Model specifications 
are shown under fit statistics. 
 
Table 5. Dynamic Capital Structure Regressions Using Only Firm-Specific Variables 
Variables Speed of Adjustment Fit Statistics 
 Profitability Size Tangibility MTB Lev_t-1 Coefficient SOA (λ ) 
Half-life 
(years) Obs 
Wald  
Chi2 
Prob>  
Chi2 
Market Leverage (MDR) 
2003-2007 -0.2246*** (-3.42) 
0.0040 
(1.11) 
0.0510 
(1.51) 
-0.0002 
(-0.02) 
0.6184*** 
(9.70) 38.16% 1.44 697 208.05 0.0000 
2004-2008 -0.1771** (-2.67) 
0.0114** 
(2.70) 
0.0709 
(1.91) 
-0.0030 
(-0.29) 
0.5859*** 
(9.93) 41.41% 1.30 797 216.97 0.0000 
2005-2009 -0.1728** (-2.69) 
0.0100* 
(2.04) 
0.0703 
(1.74) 
-0.0094 
(-0.93) 
0.4744*** 
(7.06) 52.56% 0.93 697 128.00 0.0000 
2006-2010 -0.1608* (-2.53) 
0.0106* 
(2.08) 
0.1084** 
(2.67) 
-0.0074 
(-0.80) 
0.4201*** 
(6.88) 57.99% 0.80 702 124.30 0.0000 
2007-2011 -0.1227* (-2.21) 
0.0027 
(0.97) 
0.0588* 
(2.35) 
-0.0044 
(-0.60) 
0.8147*** 
(15.22) 18.53% 3.38 704 401.28 0.0000 
2008-2012 -0.1400* (-2.46) 
0.0032 
(1.05) 
0.0641* 
(2.55) 
-0.0051 
(-0.61) 
0.7983*** 
(25.61) 20.17% 3.08 564 1,004.77 0.0000 
Full Sample -0.2225*** (-4.50) 
0.0078* 
(2.29) 
0.0787** 
(2.74) 
-0.0041 
(-0.54) 
0.5808*** 
(16.18) 41.92% 1.28 1,261 483.66 0.0000 
Book Leverage ( BDR ) 
2003-2007 -0.2295*** (-3.36) 
0.0152** 
(3.10) 
0.0907* 
(2.15) 
-0.0004 
(-0.04) 
0.4085*** 
(9.89) 59.15% 0.77 708 183.08 0.0000 
2004-2008 -0.1264* (-2.05) 
0.0146*** 
(3.84) 
0.0913** 
(2.70) 
-0.0008 
(-0.08) 
0.5888*** 
(12.89) 41.12% 1.31 707 310.06 0.0000 
2005-2009 -0.1227* (-2.06) 
0.0146** 
(2.94) 
0.1240** 
(3.04) 
0.0046 
(0.51) 
0.4366*** 
(9.52) 56.34% 0.84 708 192.46 0.0000 
2006-2010 -0.1615** (-2.67) 
0.0063 
(1.62) 
0.0709* 
(2.15) 
0.0116 
(1.43) 
0.6266*** 
(9.07) 37.34% 1.48 709 143.36 0.0000 
2007-2011 -0.1162 (-1.93) 
0.0094* 
(2.49) 
0.0572 
(1.87) 
0.0139 
(1.69) 
0.6502*** 
(9.04) 34.98% 1.61 709 141.42 0.0000 
2008-2012 -0.1457** (-2.75) 
0.0048 
(1.66) 
0.0455 
(1.94) 
0.0132 
(1.82) 
0.8582*** 
(32.10) 14.18% 4.53 568 1,215.58 0.0000 
Full Sample -0.1957*** (-3.96) 
0.0154*** 
(3.89) 
0.0826* 
(2.47) 
0.0051 
(0.71) 
0.4734*** 
(18.15) 52.66% 0.93 1,276 502.70 0.0000 
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Robustness Test  
 
The study used two further tests to check for the robustness of the rejection of the market timing theory. 
The first robustness test involved using the market timing measure suggested by Baker and Wurgler (2002), the !"#$%&'(). Following Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012), this measure was computed using only long-term debt. 
Thus regression model 1 was modified to:  
 *+,-,'/0 = 2 + 1 − 6 *+,-,' + 6 7-,'80 + 689!"#$%&'() + :-,' + ;-,'/0<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< (11) 
 
This is regression model 3. To validate the market timing theory, !"#$%&'() must be significantly 
correlated to leverage, otherwise the market timing theory is rejected. 
 
The second robustness test was suggested by Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) and uses two alternative 
market timing measures namely the external equity-weighted average market-to-book ratio (EEWAMB) and the 
long-term debt-weighted average market-to-book ratio (DWAMB), defined as follows:  
 !!#$%&' = 0=( >? >@ABC@DC'E0FG0 ×%&F<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< (12) 
 I#$%&' = 0=( J'K?J'K@ABC@DC'E0FG0 ×%&F<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< (13) 
 
These measures separately test for the market timing hypothesis of both equity and debt issuance decisions. 
The I#$%&' uses only long-term debt issuance, as this is more likely to represent market timing than short-term 
debt does. The regression model 1 partial adjustment model is therefore restated as:  
 *+,-,'/0 = 2 + 1 − 6 *+,-,' + 6 7-,'80 + 689!!#$%&' + 68LI#$%&' + :-,' + ;-,'/0<<<<<<< (14) 
 
This is regression model 4. A significant negative correlation between leverage and !!#$%& confirms 
the validity of the market timing theory, whilst a positive correlation validates the static trade-off theory. A 
significant positive correlation between I#$%& and leverage validates the market timing theory. The results of 
both tests are contained in Tables 6 and 7 respectively.  
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Regression model 3 results: 
 !"#$,&'( = 1 − , !"#$,& + , .$,&/( + ,/0123456&78 + 9$,& + :$,&'( 
 
Where λ is the SOA towards the target leverage, .$,& is a vector of firm characteristics that determine the target leverage and the SOA towards the target leverage, /( and /0 are 
coefficient vectors,  9$ is the time-invariant unobserved variable (firm fixed effect) and :$,&'( is an error term. The vector  .$,& consists of the variables: profitability, size, 
tangibility and the un-weighted market-to-book ratio, and these are defined in Table 3. 123456&78is the modified  Baker and Wurgler (2002:12)market timing measure 
which is also defined in Table 3. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The markings ***, ** and * on coefficient estimates denote significant differences from zero at the 
levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The implied half-life is calculated as: ℎ<=> − =?>" = logC(0.5) logC(1 − ,).  Model specifications are shown under fit statistics. 
 
Table 6. Robustness Test: The Impact of the Modified Baker and Wurgler (2002:12) Market Timing Measure on Capital Structure Regressions 
 Variables Speed of Adjustment Fit Statistics 
 Profitability Size Tangibility MTB IJKLMNONK Lev_t+1 Coefficient SOA (λ ) Half-life (years) Obs Wald Chi2 Prob> Chi2 
Market Leverage (MDR) 
2003-2007 -0.2162*** (-3.36) 
0.0039 
(1.14) 
0.0504 
(1.55) 
-0.0055 
(-0.57) 
0.0439* 
(2.30) 
0.6345*** 
(9.95) 36.55% 1.52 694 221.06 0.0000 
2004-2008 -0.1730** (-2.63) 
0.0108** 
(2.62) 
0.0707 
(1.94) 
-0.0069 
(-0.66) 
0.0271 
(1.56) 
0.5928*** 
(10.00) 40.72% 1.33 694 219.59 0.0000 
2005-2009 -0.1709** (-2.68) 
0.0093 
(1.94) 
0.0684 
(1.72) 
-0.0128 
(-1.24) 
0.0232 
(1.46) 
0.4868*** 
(7.01) 51.32% 0.96 696 127.36 0.0000 
2006-2010 -0.1613* (-2.54) 
0.0101* 
(1.98) 
0.1045** 
(2.59) 
-0.0108 
(-1.15) 
0.0247 
(1.60) 
0.4243*** 
(6.89) 57.57% 0.81 700 125.75 0.0000 
2007-2011 -0.1257* (-2.26) 
0.0022 
(0.76) 
0.0576 
(2.30) 
-0.0075 
(-1.00) 
0.0459* 
(2.20) 
0.8155*** 
(15.03) 18.45% 3.40 703 400.73 0.0000 
2008-2012 -0.1406* (-2.47) 
0.0027 
(0.90) 
0.0629* 
(2.51) 
-0.0071 
(-0.85) 
0.0340 
(1.28) 
0.7994*** 
(25.67) 20.06% 3.10 564 1,009.40 0.0000 
Full Sample -0.2211*** (-4.49) 
0.0075* 
(2.21) 
0.0795** 
(2.79) 
-0.0082 
(-1.08) 
0.0395* 
(2.40) 
0.5811*** 
(16.11) 41.89% 1.28 1,258 490.11 0.0000 
Book Leverage ( BDR ) 
2003-2007 -0.2264*** (-3.32) 
0.0152** 
(3.10) 
0.0937* 
(2.23) 
-0.0039 
(-0.39) 
0.0273 
(1.49) 
0.4055*** 
(9.72) 59.45% 0.77 705 183.73 0.0000 
2004-2008 -0.1276* (-2.07) 
0.0145*** 
(3.82) 
0.0907** 
(2.69) 
-0.0009 
(-0.10) 
0.0020 
(0.12) 
0.5909*** 
(12.89) 40.91% 1.32 704 310.29 0.0000 
2005-2009 -0.1231* (-2.07) 
0.0144** 
(2.90) 
0.1240** 
(3.03) 
0.0036 
(0.39) 
0.0074 
(0.52) 
0.4353*** 
(9.38) 56.47% 0.83 705 192.20 0.0000 
2006-2010 -0.1628** (-2.70) 
0.0061 
(1.59) 
0.0691* 
(2.12) 
0.0119 
(1.45) 
-0.0039 
(-0.24) 
0.6335*** 
(9.25) 36.65% 1.52 707 147.53 0.0000 
2007-2011 -0.1144 (-1.90) 
0.0095* 
(2.55) 
0.0569 
(1.87) 
0.0150 
(1.81) 
-0.0170 
(-0.84) 
0.6561*** 
(9.45) 34.39% 1.64 708 151.20 0.0000 
2008-2012 -0.1444** (-2.73) 
0.0052 
(1.83) 
0.0465* 
(1.99) 
0.0157* 
(2.12) 
-0.0396 
(-1.69) 
0.8594*** 
(32.20) 14.06% 4.57 568 1,223.19 0.0000 
Full Sample -0.1964*** (-3.97) 
0.0153*** 
(3.87) 
0.0826* 
(2.47) 
-0.0045 
(-0.61) 
0.0056 
(0.36) 
0.4728*** 
(25.86) 52.72% 0.93 1,273 502.79 0.0000 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2015 Volume 31, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 2064 The Clute Institute 
Regression model 4 results:  
 !"#$,&'( = P + 1 − , !"#$,& + , .$,&/( + ,/0113456& + ,/QR3456& + 9$,& + :$,&'( 
 
Where λ is the SOA towards the target leverage, .$,& is a vector of firm characteristics that determine the target leverage and the SOA towards the target leverage, /(, /0 and /Q are 
coefficient vectors,  9$ is the time-invariant unobserved variable (firm fixed effect) and :$,&'( is an error term. The vector .$,& consists of the variables: profitability, size, tangibility 
and the un-weighted market-to-book ratio, and these are defined in Table 3. 113456&andR3456& are the Bruinshoofd and De Haan (2012) equity and debt timing measures 
respectively; these are defined in Table 3. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The markings ***, ** and * on coefficient estimates denote significant differences from zero at 
the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The implied half-life is calculated as: ℎ<=> − =?>" = logC(0.5) logC(1 − ,).  Model specifications are shown under fit statistics.   
 
Table 7. Robustness Test: The Impact of Separate Equity and Debt Market Timing Measures on Capital Structure Regressions 
Variables Speed of Adjustment Fit Statistics 
 Profitibility Size Tangibility MTB IIKLMNO SKLMNO Lev_t+1 Coefficient SOA (λ ) Half-life (years) Obs Wald Chi2 Prob> Chi2 
Market Leverage (MDR) 
2003-2007 -0.2058** (-3.11) 
0.0037 
(1.05) 
0.0524 
(1.53) 
-0.0071 
(-0.73) 
0.0224 
(0.51) 
0.0414 
(1.44) 
0.6244*** 
(9.70) 35.56% 1.47 672 224.87 0.0000 
2004-2008 -0.1687* (-2.48) 
0.0121** 
(2.75) 
0.0668 
(1.73) 
-0.0071 
(-0.68) 
0.0075 
(0.20) 
0.0479* 
(2.17) 
0.5760*** 
(9.20) 42.40% 1.26 672 209.49 0.0000 
2005-2009 -0.1811** (-2.75) 
0.0100* 
(1.98) 
0.0571 
(1.37) 
-0.0141 
(-1.35) 
0.0414 
(1.10) 
0.0535* 
(2.48) 
0.4656*** 
(6.75) 53.44% 0.91 675 126.87 0.0000 
2006-2010 -0.1620* (-2.51) 
0.0110* 
(2.09) 
0.0848* 
(2.02) 
-0.0116 
(-1.22) 
0.0668* 
(1.99) 
0.0476* 
(2.22) 
0.4040*** 
(6.54) 59.60% 0.76 677 119.12 0.0000 
2007-2011 -0.1245* (-2.15) 
0.0027 
(0.90) 
0.0421 
(1.58) 
-0.0065 
(-0.85) 
0.0834* 
(2.16) 
0.0603* 
(2.16) 
0.7963*** 
(13.69) 20.37% 3.04 681 347.32 0.0000 
2008-2012 -0.1287* (-2.25) 
0.0035 
(1.16) 
0.0396 
(1.54) 
-0.0081 
(-0.98) 
0.1073* 
(2.20) 
0.0509 
(1.59) 
0.7965*** 
(25.27) 20.35% 3.05 545 981.38 0.0000 
Full Sample -0.2014*** (-4.03) 
0.0078* 
(2.27) 
0.0681* 
(2.37) 
-0.0106 
(-1.39) 
0.0560 
(1.68) 
0.0403 
(1.85) 
0.5859*** 
(15.79) 41.41% 1.30 1,217 478.80 0.0000 
Book Leverage ( BDR ) 
2003-2007 -0.2445*** (-3.46) 
0.0165** 
(3.03) 
0.1016* 
(2.19) 
-0.0021 
(-0.21) 
-0.0022 
(-0.05) 
0.0153 
(0.57) 
0.3500*** 
(8.30) 65.00% 0.66 683 149.47 0.0000 
2004-2008 -0.1487* (-2.32) 
0.0150*** 
(3.72) 
0.0956** 
(2.61) 
0.0012 
(0.13) 
-0.0009 
(-0.03) 
0.0106 
(0.50) 
0.5700*** 
(11.03) 43.00% 1.23 682 275.58 0.0000 
2005-2009 -0.1505* (-2.51) 
0.0141** 
(2.81) 
0.1254** 
(3.03) 
0.0047 
(0.52) 
0.0302 
(0.91) 
0.0202 
(1.06) 
0.4306*** 
(9.23) 56.94% 0.82 684 197.87 0.0000 
2006-2010 -0.1714** (-2.87) 
0.0050 
(1.35) 
0.0530 
(1.60) 
0.0124 
(1.56) 
0.0246 
(0.69) 
0.0253 
(1.11) 
0.6664*** 
(8.62) 33.36% 1.71 684 152.86 0.0000 
2007-2011 -0.1026 (-1.80) 
0.0079* 
(2.43) 
0.0342 
(1.22) 
0.0112 
(1.40) 
0.0298 
(0.81) 
0.0119 
(0.44) 
0.7523*** 
(9.45) 24.77% 2.44 686 206.15 0.0000 
2008-2012 -0.1412** (-2.65) 
0.0048 
(1.65) 
0.0344 
(1.43) 
0.0122 
(1.66) 
0.0399 
(0.87) 
0.0135 
(0.45) 
0.8514*** 
(29.90) 14.86% 4.31 549 1,094.57 0.0000 
Full Sample -0.2004*** (-3.97) 
0.0161*** 
(3.84) 
0.0848* 
(2.34) 
0.0041 
(0.55) 
0.0120 
(0.38) 
0.0163 
(0.80) 
0.4514*** 
(16.32) 54.86% 0.87 1,232 455.43 0.0000 
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Regression Model 3: Robustness Test Results  
 
Robustness Test 1 
 
The results of the test are contained in Table 6. The test results are consistent with the main empirical 
results. Both the MDR and the BDR decrease with an increase in both profitability and growth rate. Size and 
tangibility are positively related to the MDR and the BDR. Profitability and size are significant determinants of both 
the MDR and the BDR.  The market timing measure,!"#$%&'() is positively correlated to both the MDR and the 
BDR, and these results reject the market timing theory hypothesis. The SOA is within the range of the main 
empirical tests. The sample SOA is 41.89% (half-life of 1.28 years) for the MDR and 52.72% (half-life of 0.93 
years) for the BDR. This implies that the !"#$%&'(* and !"#$%&'() market timing measures do not differ 
significantly. The findings on the SOA validate the dynamic trade-off theory. The market timing measure has a 
negligible impact on the correlation of the variables and on the SOA.  
 
Regression Model 4: Robustness Test 2 
 
The results of the test are contained in Table 7. The correlation results for profitability, size, tangibility and 
growth rate are similar to those of the main empirical tests. The timing of both equity and debt issuances is 
positively correlated to both the MDR and the BDR. The results reject the hypothesis of the market timing theory. 
As with test 1, the SOA results are within the range of the main empirical findings. The SOA is 41.41% (half-life of 
1.30 years) for the MDR and 54.86% (half-life of 0.87 years) for the BDR. The results of the two tests confirm the 
robustness of the main empirical findings. The market timing theory is thus rejected. This implies that non-financial 
firms listed on the JSE do not follow the predictions of the market timing theory in security issuances. Overall, the 
results support the pecking order theory and the two versions of the trade-off theory, namely the static trade-off 
theory and the dynamic trade-off theory.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although the market timing theory offers sound reasons for why managers should time both the equity and 
debt markets in making security issuance decisions, the results of this study soundly reject the validity of the market 
timing theory. The results are robust and they generally support the pecking order and dynamic trade-off theories. 
The positive correlation between leverage and all the market timing measures suggests that South African managers 
do not time the market in raising capital. Instead, they have target leverage ratios towards which they actively 
rebalance at relatively higher speeds, and this validates the dynamic trade-off theory. Furthermore, in line with the 
validity of the pecking order theory, the managers value financial flexibility. The results of the study further confirm 
the fact that the trade-off and pecking order theories are not mutually exclusive. This finding is consistent with the 
findings of Moyo et al (2013) and Ramjee and Gwatidzo (2012).  
 
The findings of this study are limited to JSE-listed non-financial firms. The study specifically excluded 
listed financial services firms and unlisted firms, and therefore the results cannot be generalised to all South African 
firms. The second limitation to this research is that it only used the random effects Tobit estimator. A study by 
Moyo et al (2013) found that correlation and SOA parameter estimates also depend on the estimator used to fit the 
partial adjustment model. Future studies could use other linear dynamic panel data estimators such as the bias-
corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDV), system generalized methods of moments (GMM), difference 
GMM and the Anderson-Hsiao instrumental variables to test for the validity of the market timing, dynamic trade-off 
and pecking order theories. To further improve the understanding of corporate financing behaviour in South Africa, 
the tests could also be extended to financial services and unlisted non-financial firms.  
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